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I t is strange indeed that an individual whose only military experience has been with land forces and who has only once been aboard a warship (and that was 
to be present at a ceremony where the ashes of a deceased naval officer were 
strewn at sea) should be asked to present a paper on the subject of "Means and 
Methods of Combat at Sea" to this Round Table. In view of the fact that there 
are a great number of naval experts present, I cannot even believe that it was 
intended to be a case of the blind leading the blind! If this had been scheduled 
to be the first paper delivered I would have assumed that the organizers of this 
Round Table were motivated by the desire to lay a groundwork in this area at 
the lowest possible technical level and then work up to the more esoteric 
problems. However, in view of the sequence of the programming, that 
explanation likewise seems to be ruled out. Fortunately I am in a position to 
state without fear of challenge that because of limitations of time and space, I 
will only be able to specify the modern methods or means of conducting warfare 
at sea with respect to which there appear to be legal problems, without 
attempting to offer any solutions to those problems. 
It will be recalled that the Final Act of the 1907 Hague Peace Conference 
included the statement of a wish that its successor conference prepare regulations 
relative to the laws and customs of naval warfare.1 Of course, because of the 
outbreak of World War I, that conference never took place and the series of 
Hague Peace Conferences was brought to an end. Subsequent efforts to fill the 
lacunae in the law of naval warfare through conventional means, such as the 1909 
Declaration ofLondon,z were, for one reason or another, unsuccessful, with the 
result that, apart from the much-disregarded 1936 London Proces-Verbal on 
submarine warfare,3 the law of naval warfare consists basically of the 1856 
Declaration ofParis,4 the several conventions on the subject adopted in 1907, 
the 1949 Second Geneva Convention,S and customary international law. 
The 1977 Protocol I 
An important preliminary question concerns the extent, if any, to which 
Article 49 of the 1977 Protocol 16 makes the provisions of that Protocol 
applicable to warfare at sea. It unquestionably applies to naval bombardments of 
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land targets, the subject of the 1907 Hague Convention IX Concerning 
Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War? Does it also apply generally 
to other methods and means of conducting warfare at sea? One commentator, 
Dr. Elmar Rauch, asserts with considerable vigor that this protocol "regulates 
the conduct of hostilities and the pertinent treaty provisions apply to any land, 
air, or sea warfare.,,8 Another commentator, Professor Frits Kalshoven, is equally 
categorical in asserting that "[t]his goes to show once again that the Diplomatic 
Conference, carefully avoided taking up, in particular, the matter of naval 
~ ,,9 
wanare proper. 
When Dr. Rauch presented his thesis to a Committee of the International 
Society for Military Law and the Law of War at Garmisch in September 1985, 
it generated considerable controversy. At the risk of oversimplification, I shall 
quote the two paragraphs of the article of the Protocol relied upon by Dr. Rauch 
and a very small part of the relevant activities at the Diplomatic Conference and 
then let you draw your own conclusions: 
Article 49-Definition of attacks and scope of application 
3. The provisions of this Section apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may 
affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They 
further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land 
but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict at sea or in the air. 
4. The provisions of this Section are additional to the rules concerning 
humanitarian protection contained in the Fourth Convention, particularly in Part 
II thereof, and in other international agreements binding upon the High 
Contracting Parties, as well as to other rules of international law relating to the 
protection of civilians and civilian objects on land, at sea or in the air against the 
effects of hostilities. 
When Article 49, then draft Article 44, was being discussed in the Working 
Group of Committee III of the Diplomatic Conference, the words "on land" 
at the end of what is now the first sentence of paragraph 3 were the subject of 
considerable debate. The following statement with respect thereto is contained 
in the report of the Working Group: 
Discussions in the Working Group showed almost complete agreement that it 
would be both difficult and undesirable in the time available to try to review and 
revise the laws applicable to armed conflict at sea and in the air. Moreover, it was 
clear that we should be careful not to revise that body oflaw inadvertendy through 
this article. The solution was found by combining the ICRC text with a sentence 
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which stated clearly that, except for attacks against objectives on land, the law 
applicable to armed conflict at sea or in the air is unaffected. 
Several delegates wish it recorded that they remain dissatisfied with this draft. 
They object to the phrase 'on land' in the first sentence and to the second sentence 
as a whole. These delegates would prefer to have this section of the Protocol affect 
the law applicable to the conduct of warfare at sea or in the air to the extent that 
provisions of this Section would be more favorable to civilians than the existing 
law.lO 
The additional sentence referred to is, of course, the second sentence in 
Paragraph 3 (then paragraph 1). At the meeting of Committee III which took 
place immediately after the submission of that report, the following occurred: 
The term 'on land' was adopted by 56 votes to one, with 7 abstentions. The part 
of the second sentence beginning with 'but do not' ... and ending with ... 'or 
in the air' was adopted by 56 votes to one, with nine abstentions. 
Paragraph 1 of Article 44 was adopted by 60 votes to none, with 7 abstentions.ii 
The Report of Committee III, Second Session, adopted the wording of the 
report of the Working Group almost verbatim12 and the Plenary Meeting 
adopted the article without discussion.13 I now ask you: <;lid the Diplomatic 
Conference make the provisions of the 1977 Protocol I generally applicable to 
14 
warfare at sea? 
Blockade 
For centuries a naval blockade for the purpose of cutting off supplies to the 
enemy, like a land siege, has been an accepted method of conducting naval 
warfare and the supplies so cut off have frequendy included foodstuffi. This has 
been true whether foodstuffi have been considered to be absolute contraband, 
conditional contraband, or not contraband. The unratified 1909 Declaration of 
London 15 (which itself stated that it corresponded with generally recognized 
principles of international law) listed foodstuffi as conditional contraband. The 
imposition of the "long distance" blockade by the United Kingdom during 
W orId War I was intended to bring Germany to its knees by starving the civilian 
population and it is alleged to have caused the deaths by malnutrition of half a 
million German noncombatants.16 When, during the last year ofWorId War 
II, the United States instituted a blockade of Japan primarily by mining the waters 
around that country, it actually called the mining program "Operation 
Starvation.,,17 
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Article 3 of the Resolution of the General Assembly on the Question of 
Defining Aggression includes in its list of acts qualifying as acts of aggression, 
"regardless of a declaration of war": 18 "(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts 
of a State by the armed forces of another State." 
One well-known commentator on the subject has stated: 
The 'blockade of the ports or coasts' of another State was another listed 
indicator of aggression, but what precisely constituted a 'blockade . . . was 
deliberately left vague.'19 
Does this provision of the resolution purport to constitute an attempt to 
eliminate the blockade completely, as a method of conducting warfare at sea? 
Does this mean that even after there is no question but that hostilities have 
erupted between two or more nations and after the Security Council has been 
unable to obtain a cease fire, and the two sides are attacking each other wherever 
they are in contact and are bombing each other wherever targets are available, 
the imposition of a blockade by one of the participants in the dispute would be 
an act of aggression? Did the Committee which drafted the definition of 
aggression consider that, among other things, it was recommending a material 
change in the law of warfare at sea? Or was the banning of blockades a 
prohibition on the use of this type of force to bring pressure to bear on a nation 
during peacetime, such as that used by Germany, Great Britain, and Italy against 
Venezuela in 1902?20 
Article 54(1) of the 1977 Protocol I states?l "Starvation of civilians as a 
method of warfare is prohibited. ,,22 Does this mean that naval blockades may 
no longer prevent foodstuffs from reaching enemy ports? The 1975 Report of 
the Committee charged with this matter by the Diplomatic Conference stated?3 
"The fact that the paragraph [Article 54(1)] does not change the law of naval 
blockade is made clear by Article 44, paragraph 1 [Article 49(3)]." 
The Australian delegation was even more specific in its explanation of its 
vote. It said: 
The Australian delegation wishes to place on record its view that Article 48 [now 
Article 54] does not prevent military operations intended to control and regulate 
the production and distribution of foodstuffi to the civilian population, and that 
it does not affect existing legal rule concerning the right of military forces to 
requisition foodstuffs. Moreover, in the view of my delegation, nothing in Article 
48 direcdy or indirecdy affects existing rules concerning naval blockade.24 
Dr. Rauch disagrees with the foregoing interpretations of Article 54(1) of the 
1977 Protocol I, taking the position that under that provision of the Protocol 
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there is an absolute prohibition of a naval blockade of foodstuffi?S It remains 
to be seen how belligerents will interpret it. 
Mine Warfare 
The only conventional law with respect to the subject of mine warfare at sea 
is the 1907 Hague Convention No. VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic 
Submarine Contact Mines.26 Inasmuch as that Convention repeatedly refers to 
"automatic contact mines," there is a dispute on the question of its applicability 
to the modem "influence mines" (magnetic, pressure, acoustic, etc.), which do 
not require contact with the target in order to explode. Some commentators 
believe that the Convention is equally applicable to the various influence 
mines.27 Others believe that the wording of the Convention is so restrictive that 
mines other than those specified are not subject to its provisions.28 Professor 
O'Connell has taken the position that while influence mines are not specifically 
covered by the Convention, the practice of belligerents has been such as to bring 
them within its purview.29 Influence mines are frequendy bottom or ground 
mines, which lie on the seabed unmoored. If the Convention is applicable to 
them, the question which arises is whether, under Article 1(1) of the 
Convention, they must disarm themselves one hour after they have been 
planted-a requirement which would make them practically useless. In view of 
the validity of the dispute, this appears to be one area where new laws with 
respect to the conduct of warfare at sea might prove useful. 
During the drafting of the 1907 Hague Convention No. VIII the Netherlands 
sought to have included therein a provision which would have prohibited the 
laying of mines barring passage through a strait connecting two open seas.30 This 
proposal was rejected and all that was done in this regard was to include in the 
Commission report a statement that there was no intention to change the law 
relating to straits without stating what that law was.31 During both World Wars 
straits were mined, and with such success that it is deemed unlikely that any 
restriction on this practice would be acceptable to most nations now or in the 
foreseeable future. 
One comparatively recent development in naval weapons systems is the 
"torpedo mine." It is an anti-submarine weapons system consisting of a torpedo 
inserted into a mine casing.32 It is deployed like an ordinary mine in deep water 
in the vicinity of routes traveled by enemy submarines. It has the ability to detect 
and classify submarine targets while surface ships will pass over it without 
triggering the torpedo. At the present time it is moored but suggestions have 
been made that it be used as a bottom or ground mine, buried in the seabed for 
concealment purposes, and not moored. Two legal problems would then arise 
with respect to this weapon: first, it might be argued that under the provisions 
of Article 1(1) of the 1907 Hague Convention No. VIII such a weapon should 
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disarm itself one hour after being deployed. On the other hand, it is actually 
unarmed and inactive while lying on the seabed; the torpedo only becomes 
activated, armed, and sent on its way when it receives the signal of the approach 
of a target-a submarine. The second problem is that under Article 1 (3) of the 
Convention a torpedo which misses its mark must become harmless. When 
released, the encapsulated torpedo would be no different from any other 
torpedo. Presumably the fact that it would sink to the bottom of the sea at the 
end of an unsuccessful run would meet the Convention's requirement although 
it is probable that all torpedoes can be and are programmed to disarm themselves 
when they miss their target. 
One final aspect of mine warfare is worthy of mention. In 1972 the Seabed 
Arms Control Treaty33 came into effect. This Treaty prohibits emplacing or 
emplanting any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass 
destruction on the seabed beyond a twelve-mile coastal zone. The same 
restriction exists as to any facilities for storing, testing, or using such weapons. 
The coastal State, whether belligerent or neutral, may emplace or emplant any 
type of mine, conventional or nuclear, within its twelve-mile zone, subject, 
presumably, to notification, and, in appropriate cases, to the right of innocent 
passage. Other States are limited to the employing or emplanting of conventional 
mines beyond the twelve-mile zone. A belligerent may, of course, lay 
conventional mines within the territorial waters of its enemy provided that it is 
not the "sole object" of such mines to intercept commercial vessels. May it lay 
nuclear mines in those waters subject only to that same limitation? 
The Natural Environment 
There is one aspect of the conduct of war at sea to which little attention has 
been paid and which could prove catastrophic for mankind-that is, the effect 
of such warfare on the natural environment. What will happen to the live natural 
resources of the sea if supertankers carrying hundreds of thousands of tons of 
crude oil are torpedoed and sunk? Or if off-shore pumping facilities are attacked 
and left discharging their product into the sea? What will happen to those natural 
resources and to mankind itself if nuclear submarines and other nuclear warships 
are destroyed by shells, missiles, mines, or torpedoes? Or if a warship, surface or 
submarine, carrying weapons with nuclear warheads is so destroyed? While there 
are "fail-safe" devices intended to protect against harm arising from these two 
latter eventualities, not only will there be instances where they cannot operate, 
but events have demonstrated the undependability of such devices. I have no 
solution for this problem nor, unfortunately, can I envision any rules in this 
regard which would be generally acceptable to states?4 Even if the provisions 
of the 1977 Protocol I are deemed to be applicable to warfare at sea, it does not 
appear that its Articles 35 and 55 thereof will solve the problem. For example, 
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no torpedo mine is programmed in such a way as to limit its attacks to 
conventional submarines. And with the desperate need for oil of every 
belligerent during wartime, no nation can realistically be expected to provide 
in its rules of engagement a prohibition against attacks on tankers.35 
Missiles 
The development and use of missiles with conventional warheads, such as 
Exocet, should not create any major legal problems. As in land warfare, they are 
nothing more than modem artillery, even when they are used over the horizon. 
Of course, if missiles from the sea are used against land targets their use is subject 
to the provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention No. IX. Concerning 
Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time ofWar36 and the 1977 Protocol 1.37 
However, if they are used against targets at sea they are subject to no prohibitions 
or restrictions not imposed on the use of a warship's guns. One commentator, 
writing in 1972, questioned whether naval surface-to-surface missiles were 
"sufficiently discriminating to ensure that the distinction between military targets 
on the one hand, and civilian and neutral targets on the other, can be 
maintained.,,38 However, while a missile, like any other projectile, may hit an 
innocent victim and thus create an international incident, this would not appear 
to affect the legal status of missiles as a means of conducting warfare at sea. 
Exclusion Zones 
Naval warfare may take place anywhere that ships may sail except in the 
territorial seas or internal waters of neutral states. This, of course, includes the 
high seas. The right of neutral vessels and aircraft to use the high seas, even 
during wartime, cannot be denied-but, legally or illegally, certain limitations 
have frequently been placed on that right by belligerents. One such limitation 
which has had many names is probably now best known as an "exclusion zone." 
One commentator, Commander Fenrick, has defined this term as follows: 
An exclusion zone, also referred to as a military area, barred area, war zone or 
operational zone, is an area of water and superadjacent air space in which a party 
to an armed conflict purports to exercise control and to which it denies access to 
hi d · ft·th .. 39 s ps an alrcra WI out perrrusslOn. 
Exclusion zones, under various names, were notified in both World Wars, 
frequently under the guise of reprisals. After World War II the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg found German Admiral Doenitz guilty 
of a violation of the 1936 London Proces-Verbal (protocol 1)40 holding: 
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The order ofDoenitz to sink neutral ships without warning when within these 
[operational] zones was, therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, a violation of 
the protoco1.41 
It will be noted that the Tribunal referred only to the sinking without warning 
of neutral ships within these zones. The effect of such an order directed solely at 
enemy merchant vessels is left unstated.42 During the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas 
War the establishment of exclusion zones proliferated with the British 
announcing four and the Argentines announcing three.43 The most extensive 
such zone announced by the British was its Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) of28 
April 1982, effective 30 April 1982. The core of that announcement was to the 
effect that: 
Any ship and any aircraft, whether military or civilian, which is found within the 
zone without authority from the Ministry of Defence in London will be regarded 
as operating in support of the illegal occupation [of the Falkland Islands] and will 
therefore be regarded as hostile and will be liable to be attacked by British forces.44 
So far as is known, the Soviet Union was the only neutral to protest this 
action-perhaps out of pique because a British spokesman had made reference 
to "Soviet spy ships trailing the British forces inside the Zone. ,,45 
Exclusion zones of a sort have been announced by both Iran and Iraq in their 
long-running war.46 That complicated situation, with both sides in violation of 
intemationallaw at least as frequendy as they are in compliance with it, is better 
not used either as a precedent or as an indication of the practice of states. 
In his study of exclusion zones Commander Fenrick makes the following 
proposal: 
It is suggested that ifbelligerents use exclusion zones they should publicly declare 
the existence, location and duration of the zones, what is excluded from the zone, 
and the sanctions likely to be imposed on ships or aircraft entering the zone without 
permission, and also provide enough lead time before the zone comes into effect 
to allow ships to clear the area.47 
Doesn't that sound very much like a blockade? 
I pose the following questions: Are exclusion zones a legal method of 
conducting warfare at sea? If not, are there any possible limiting factors which 
could make them legal? 
Submarine Warfare 
Part IV of the 1930 London Naval Treaty 48 contains two rules with respect 
to the method of conducting submarine warfare: first, they must conform to the 
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rules applicable to surface vessels: and, second, except in certain limited and 
specified cases, they are prohibited from sinking a merchant vessel without first 
having placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place of safety-which 
does not include the ship's boats unless in proximity to land or another vessel. 
There were eleven parties to these provisions, including France, Italy,Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. The provisions were repeated in the 
1936 Proces-Verbal49 to which thirty-seven additional States, including 
Gennany and the Soviet Union, had acceded prior to the outbreak of World 
War II. 
As we have already seen, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) found 
that, while in command of the Gennan submarine force during World War II, 
Admiral Doenitz had issued orders which violated the provisions of the 1936 
Proces-Verbal. However, the Tribunal did not assess punishment for this offense 
because of evidence that both the British and the United States navies had 
followed substantially similar procedures. In other words, three of the major 
naval Powers of the time had completely disregarded the provisions of the law 
of naval warfare restricting the methods of conducting submarine warfare. The 
Tribunal apparently considered that, despite this, the 1936 Proces-Verbal 
continued to be binding international law of naval warfare. Can it really be 
believed that in any future conflict involving naval powers, submarine warfare 
\ViII be conducted in a manner other than it was in World War II? Can it be 
believed that the reiteration of the provisions on the conduct of submarine 
warfare in a new treaty, or the drafting of new restrictive provisions on this 
method of conducting naval warfare, would be other than a useless gesture? 
Conclusions 
The methods and means of conducting warfare at sea that have been developed 
since the end of World War II are unquestionably numerous. For some, no new 
conventional law is necessary. For a few, it would probably be helpful to have new 
conventional law to replace the customary law which has evolved or the complete 
lack oflaw governing their use. For still others, the likelihood of agreement on a 
viable solution appears to be completely unattainable. It is believed that more harm 
than good could result from the drafting by the large majority of non-maritime 
powers, and the attempted imposition on the maritime powers, of prohibitions and 
restrictions on methods and means of conducting warfare at sea which the latter 
powers would refuse to accept. 
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